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Human rights-based approacha b s t r a c t
The rights-based approach to development targets progress towards the realization of 30 articles set forth
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In current practice, progress is frequently measured using
the multidimensional poverty index. While elegant and useful, the multidimensional poverty index is
inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights principles of indivisibility, inalienability,
and equality. We argue that a first-order dominance (FOD) methodology maintains basic consistency
with these principles. Specifically, FOD comparisons are independent of any applied weighting schemes
and hence are free from assumptions regarding substitutability between included welfare indicators
(indivisibility). FOD cannot be established when welfare in any indicator is deteriorating, no matter
how great the advancement is in other indicators (inalienability). Finally, FOD requires that domination
occurs throughout the population (equality), implying that welfare gains among better-off groups never
offset welfare losses among worse-off groups. We discuss and compare the properties of the multidimen-
sional poverty index and first-order dominance approach and apply both measures to 26 African coun-
tries using data near 2002 and 2012. Results across the two measures are broadly similar but not the
same. For example, while the multidimensional poverty index suggests that all countries are advancing,
FOD indicates that 14 countries experience broad-based progress, two countries show more moderate
likelihoods of progress, and the remaining 10 countries neither improve nor deteriorate in terms of
attainment of rights for the dimensions considered. We conclude that the multidimensional poverty
index and first-order dominance approaches are useful complements that should be employed in tandem.
 2018 UNU-WIDER. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) as ‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations’. The UDHR contains 30 articles that define a series
of fundamental human rights. Most of these articles refer to laws
or norms that govern the functioning of society. For example,
Article 2 states that the rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR
apply without distinction of any kind, such as race, religion, or sex;
and Article 15 affirms that everyone has a right to a nationality.
These and most other articles within the Declaration can in princi-
ple be followed without reference to the material circumstancesfaced by the society in question. However, a subset of the articles
is notably easier for wealthier societies to fulfill than for poorer
societies. For instance, Articles 25 and 26 assert, respectively, that
everyone has the right to an adequate standard of living and that
everyone has the right to education, particularly at elementary
levels.
Poor countries may confront enormous or even insurmountable
(within short timeframes) obstacles in meeting these obligations of
the UDHR, regardless of the collective desire of those with
decision-making power within those societies (labeled duty-
bearers) to fulfill them. This gap between stated goals and circum-
stances on the ground makes it necessary to interpret the UDHR as
an aspirational declaration whose tenets, under favorable circum-
stances, gradually become satisfied for an increasing share of the
world’s peoples and nations.
This same gap also generates a rationale for development assis-
tance as an instrument to speed-up progress towards achieving the
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such as the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2017),
to monitor progress. Many development institutions, notably the
programs and specialized agencies of the UN, specifically link the
rights set forth in the UDHR, their development programs, and
attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These
links relate both to final goals and to the processes these institu-
tions seek to put in place to attain development goals (such as
the SDGs). The rights-based approach to development is meant
to forge these links by specifically targeting ‘the realization of
human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration’ and by
applying human rights principles as a guide to ‘all development
cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of
the programming process’ (United Nations Children’s Fund
[UNICEF], 2004, p. 91).
In terms of principles, the UN Statement of Common Under-
standing of the UDHR (see United Nations Children’s Fund, 2004,
Appendix B) insists that human rights are (among other
properties):
1. Indivisible: rights have equal status and cannot be ranked in a
hierarchical order;
2. Inalienable: rights cannot be given up or taken away;
3. Interdependent: the realization of one right may depend, at
least in part, on the realization of others; and
4. Equal: all human beings are entitled to their human rights.
This article is concerned with measurement of progress towards
the attainment of human rights, which are inherently multidimen-
sional. It falls within a large literature, both theoretical and empir-
ical, related to the measurement of welfare across multiple
dimensions of wellbeing (Alkire et al., 2015; Ravallion, 2016). It
seeks to make three contributions. First, it assesses whether the
main approach currently employed for measuring welfare across
multiple dimensions, the multidimensional poverty index (MPI)
of Alkire and Foster (2007) (henceforth AF) is, in fact, human
rights-consistent. We assert that, while elegant and practical, the
AF approach is inconsistent with human rights principles.
Second, an alternative approach based on first-order dominance
(FOD) principles is presented and assessed (Arndt et al., 2012;
Arndt, Østerdal, & Siersbæk, 2016; Østerdal, 2010). The FOD
approach is in line with the four human rights principles listed
above.
Third, the AF and FOD approaches are applied to data for 26
African countries to determine welfare rankings around the year
2002 and for the most recent data point available (approximately
the year 2012). The AF and FOD approaches generally provide sim-
ilar country rankings in both time periods and both point broadly
to progress over time. Divergences between the AF and the FOD
approaches do occur, and provide significant additional informa-
tion. The AF and FOD approaches are therefore best viewed as com-
plementary methodologies that should be employed in tandem.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2
presents the AF and FOD approaches and assesses them in the con-
text of a rights-based development approach. Section 3 presents
the application to welfare assessment for sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA), while Section 4 concludes.2. The multidimensional poverty index and first-order
dominance
2.1. Review of recent applications
The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) MPI
(Alkire & Santos, 2010) and the underlying AF methodology(Alkire & Foster, 2007; Alkire et al., 2015) provide an important
avenue for within- and cross-country multidimensional welfare
comparisons and for comparisons over time. The MPI is relatively
easy to compute from, for example, standard Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS) and/or UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster
Surveys (MICS) and is decomposable following the Foster, Greer,
and Thorbecke (1984) class of poverty measures. Batana (2013)
applies the AF method across 14 SSA countries to study poverty
of women in the dimensions of assets, health, schooling, and
empowerment. Alkire and Housseini (2014) present an extensive
evaluation of multidimensional poverty in 37 SSA countries based
on the 2014 MPI and on a modified index capturing severe depri-
vation. Analysis was extended to sub-regional decompositions
and an assessment of poverty dynamics in 19 countries with con-
sistent time-series.
FOD is also well-suited to within- and cross-country multidi-
mensional welfare comparisons. It is, perhaps, particularly well-
suited to welfare comparisons through time. It was applied to Viet-
nam and Mozambique by Arndt et al. (2012), and FOD has since
been applied to numerous countries, including the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia.
The results of the work on the countries just listed are presented in
companion volumes examining growth and poverty in sub-
Saharan Africa (Arndt, McKay, & Tarp, 2016) and techniques in
poverty measurement (Arndt & Tarp, 2016). Also, Permanyer and
Hussain (2017) applied FOD analysis to a cross-country study of
38 developing countries and, using the same set of indicators, com-
pared their results to other multidimensional methodologies.
The next two subsections provide a brief review of each
approach.
2.2. Multidimensional poverty index
A detailed development of the MPI can be found in Alkire et al.
(2015). Briefly, the AF approach aggregates household or individual
welfare statuses across multiple dimensions into a single index
that provides insight into both the incidence and intensity of pov-
erty. The approach depends upon dual cut-offs that identify
dimension-specific deprivation thresholds and an across-
dimension threshold (k), which specifies a share of weighted indi-
cators. Households with weighted deprivation shares of at least k
are deemed poor and the proportion of such households yields
the multidimensional poverty headcount (H). The method further
identifies the intensity of poverty (A) as the average weighted
deprivation share among the poor. The final AF poverty index is
referred to as the adjusted headcount ratio (M0 or MPI), expressed
as the product of the headcount ratio and the intensity of poverty:
M0 ¼ H  A ð1Þ
In this analysis, we follow the Alkire and Housseini (2014) MPI
analysis of SSA and set the AF poverty threshold (k) equal to one-
third of weighted indicators.
2.3. First-order dominance
Østerdal (2010) and Arndt, Østerdal, and Siersbæk (2016) pro-
vide detailed treatments of FOD theory. A discussion of FOD in
practice can be found in Arndt and Mahrt (2016). The FODmethod-
ology builds upon earlier contributions to the dominance literature
(Atkinson & Bourguignon, 1982; Bérenger, Bresson, Makdissi, &
Yazbeck, 2013; Bourguignon & Chakravarty, 2003; Cowell &
Victoria-Feser, 2007; Duclos & Échevin, 2011; Duclos & Makdissi,
2005; Duclos, Sahn, & Younger, 2007, 2011; Gravel &
Mukhopadhyay, 2010; Gravel, Moyes, & Tarroux, 2009; Lehmann,
1955; Levhari, Paroush, & Peleg, 1975; Shaked & Shanthikumar,
2007).
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deprived than deprived in any welfare dimension. As with AF,
FOD requires the identification of welfare indicators and the spec-
ification of an indicator specific threshold value that defines
deprived versus not deprived.1 Hence, AF and FOD measures are
both potentially sensitive to indicator thresholds. However, the
FOD approach permits comparison of populations without indicator
weights. And, in the absence of weights, FOD faces no need to specify
a poverty line threshold (the k in the AF approach).
Applying the FOD concept to two multidimensional discrete
population distributions, A and B, A dominates B if and only if it
is possible to obtain distribution B from distribution A by moving
probability mass from better to worse outcomes within A. Gravel
and Moyes (2012) refer to these transfers of probability mass as
‘increments in the indicators.’2
Assume we have n welfare dimensions and for each dimension
a 0/1 (deprived/not deprived) valued binary indicator is defined.
With five binary indicators (n = 5), a total of 32 (=25) unique wel-
fare status combinations are possible for each basic unit of analy-
sis, normally either an individual or a household. Let ai and bi be
the shares of populations A and B, respectively, with welfare status
i. Let the variable xij represent probability mass transfer from wel-
fare status i to welfare status j, where j is an alias of i. Define Z as
the set of source–destination pairs ij that move probability from a
preferred welfare status i (i = 1, . . . 32) to an inferior welfare status
j.
A welfare status i is preferred to status j if and only if status i is
at least as good as status j in all dimensions and better in at least
one dimension. For example, status (1,1,1,1,1), indicating not
deprived in all dimensions, is preferred to all other welfare sta-
tuses. Similarly, status (0,0,0,0,0), indicating deprived in all
dimensions, is least preferred. Moving to more complex cases, sta-
tus (1,1,1,0,0) is preferred to status (0,1,1,0,0) because the latter
status can be obtained from the former by removing the not
deprived status in dimension one, which makes the unit of analysis
unambiguously worse-off. The criterion is strict. Status (0,1,1,1,1)
is not unambiguously better than status (1,0,0,0,0).
Under these conditions, population A dominates population B
(i.e., FOD is found) if there exist xij with:xij P 0; xij 6 1; xii ¼ 0; such that ai þ
X
ji2Z
xji 
X
ij2Z
xij ¼ bi8i:
ð2Þ
Mosler and Scarsini (1991) and Dyckerhoff and Mosler (1997)
note that the system of equations described in (2) corresponds to
a linear program. Arndt et al. (2012) and Arndt and Mahrt (2016)
provide an empirical implementation of the linear programming-
based method for checking multidimensional FOD with up to seven
binary deprivation indicators.
While FOD analysis allows for comparison across populations
without imposing subjective restrictions, the FOD criterion some-
times leads to indeterminate outcomes, meaning that population
A does not dominate population B and population B does not dom-
inate population A. Satisfaction of Eq. (2) also gives no sense of the
extent of domination. We label a single test of whether population
A dominates population B as static FOD analysis. Arndt et al. (2012)
suggest supplementing static FOD analysis with FOD analysis
conducted on repeated bootstrap samples drawn from each
population (Efron, 1979). Where appropriate, bootstrapping is con-
ducted taking the survey design (strata and cluster) into account.
The subsequent FOD results can be interpreted as a measure of1 Multiple thresholds for a single indicator are possible but quickly suffer the curse
of dimensionality. In practice, both AF and FOD typically rely on binary indicators.
2 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.likelihood of domination providing substantially more information
than FOD in the static case. Furthermore, one can define a measure
of net-domination (the average frequency that an area dominates
all other populations minus the average frequency that the area
is dominated by all other populations), which can be used as a
basis to rank populations (Copeland, 1951).
2.4. Assessment
The AF and FOD approaches are defined precisely in mathemat-
ical terms providing a set of rigorous properties. In contrast, there
is no formal mathematical expression of the principles in the
UDHR. Nevertheless, comparing properties with principles, the
FOD approach conforms better to human rights concepts than
the approach propounded by AF. If we view indicators as basic
rights such as a right to a primary school education, a right to safe
water, a right to adequate sanitation, and so forth, then the weight-
ing scheme integral to AF becomes problematic. Under AF, the indi-
cators (rights) are not indivisible in that they are explicitly ranked
via the weighting scheme. Under AF, the indicators (rights) are
not inalienable in that it is perfectly possible to be judged better-
off even after a population-wide shift from not deprived to being
deprived in one indicator if there are gains in other indicators.
Under AF, the indicators (rights) are not equal in that welfare losses
among worse-off subgroups can be outweighed by gains among
better-off subgroups resulting in measured progress. Overall, when
focusing on distributions of populations as classified by deprived
or not deprived status for multiple binary indicators (rights), the
AF approach violates three of the four principles listed in Section 1.
In contrast, the FOD conforms well. Under FOD, indicators
(rights) are indivisible in that no weighting of any sort is applied.
Under FOD, indicators (rights) are inalienable in that, when popula-
tion A FOD population B, the distribution of indicators (rights) in
population A can be obtained from population B only by moving
weight from less preferred to more preferred states within popula-
tion B. Finally, under FOD, indicators are equal in that for progress
to be deemed to have occurred, it must occur across the full distri-
bution of welfare outcomes. To take just one example, population A
will never FOD population B if the share of population A in status
(0,0,0,0,0) is greater than the corresponding share in population
B. More generally, welfare gains among better-off groups never off-
set welfare losses among worse-off groups.
These differential properties can lead to dissimilar results by
approach for the same indicators and indicator thresholds. A sub-
stantial difference is that FOD may result in indeterminate out-
comes while AF will always generate a welfare ranking (though
these might not be statistically significant). Consider a simple
example with two households and three indicators where 0/1
denotes deprived/not deprived. Under FOD, dominance cannot be
established between two households with welfare outcomes such
as (0,1,0) and (1,0,1). This occurs because no assumptions are made
about the relative importance of each dimension, consistent with
human rights principles. With the AF method, a result is always
obtained, but the result depends upon how weights are assigned.
With equal weighting across indicators, the second household
attains superior welfare compared to the first, while the weighting
scheme (0.2, 0.6, 0.2) suggests the first household is associated
with greater welfare. Put differently, fidelity to very general human
rights principles, as in FOD, may come at a cost in terms of deter-
minacy of outcomes. At the same time, the determinacy of out-
comes in AF comes at the cost of violating rights-based principles
in the evaluation of welfare.
With respect to the interdependence principle, both AF and FOD
are effectively agnostic in that neither make any attempt to cap-
ture interdependence. This is appropriate. In the UN Statement of
Common Understanding (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2004,
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adduced indicates that the ‘‘realization of the right to health may
depend, in certain circumstances, on realization of the right to edu-
cation or information” (p. 92). Given this example, one could argue
that a household or individual is prospectively better off once the
education right is realized because prospects for realizing other
rights, such as health, might be improved (in certain circum-
stances). However, both AF and FOD seek to measure welfare at a
given moment (or snapshot) in time. Welfare dynamics are studied
through multiple snapshots (in practice, multiple comparable sur-
vey rounds through time as in the DHS) that meter actual, as
opposed to prospective, progress.
Note the distinction between the interdependence principle and
the concept of complements in utilitarian welfare theory. In the
latter, two goods, such as tea and milk, may be complements
because they are preferred to be enjoyed together. In contrast,
from a welfare ranking perspective with respect to realization of
rights, rights are neither substitutes nor complements. If the pat-
tern of development in country A is such that two rights are fre-
quently realized in tandem, there is no automatic linkage to a
notion of rights preference or inferences with respect to the form
of a social welfare function, not least because the pattern of devel-
opment may depend heavily on supply side factors or ad hoc deci-
sions by duty-bearers (as opposed to revealing consistent
population-wide preferences across rights). In short, rights are
not analogous to maize and cassava (substitutes) or tea and milk
(complements) in the utilitarian conception. More generally, mea-
sures, such as Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), that ‘‘impose dif-
ferent assumptions about the form” (p. 184) of the social welfare
function, such as sign conditions on derivatives of the social wel-
fare function, are not rights-consistent.3
Finally, there are important differences in interpretation of AF
and FOD results. AF is a distance measure with a cardinal interpre-
tation. Static FOD is a binary comparison with an ordinal interpre-
tation (i.e., A dominates B). The application of the bootstrap
produces a large number of binary comparisons. By counting the
number of dominations recorded and then applying an affine
transformation, a Copeland index can be created. This index
reflects an underlying (cardinal) count of the number of domina-
tions but does not reflect any particular magnitude of welfare
change. Indeed, as will be seen in Section 3, it is possible for coun-
try A to register strong progress through time by FOD even though
the shares of the population not deprived in the indicators in focus
improve by small magnitudes. A similar logic applies to compar-
isons across countries.There are also practical differences in the
application of AF and FOD. These are best discussed in the context
of an application.3. Application to sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan African economies have seen relatively high
growth rates during the last 20 years (IMF, 2013). The extent to
which growth has improved the living conditions for those living
in poverty is less clear; thus, the Bourguignon (2004) poverty,
growth, inequality triangle continues to be widely debated (e.g.,
Arndt, McKay, & Tarp, 2016; Fosu, 2015; Thorbecke, 2013). Here
we frame the first aspect of the triangle, poverty, in the context
of attaining basic human rights, which is inherently nonmonetary
and multidimensional in nature. The expansion of DHS and MICS
over the last two decades has greatly enhanced the potential for
consistent multidimensional poverty analysis across countries3 Interpretation of the interdependence principle is tricky. Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer who, while not necessarily endorsing the interpretation provided here,
obliged the authors to think carefully and systematically in this domain.and time. Yet, relatively few studies define a consistent set of wel-
fare measures to assess multidimensional wellbeing across African
countries. Sahn and Stifel (2000) apply factor analysis of household
socioeconomic characteristics in 15 SSA countries. Booysen, Van
Der Berg, Burger, Von Maltitz, and Du Rand (2008) extend this
work for seven SSA countries, employing multiple correspondence
rather than factor analysis. As mentioned, Batana (2013) applies
the AF method in an assessment of women’s wellbeing in 14 SSA
countries. And, in the most comprehensive analysis, Alkire and
Housseini (2014) present an evaluation of 37 SSA countries based
on the 2014 MPI as well as a modified index capturing severe
deprivation.
We pursue a double goal of first contributing to this literature
by identifying welfare rankings of 26 SSA countries and evaluating
the extent to which broad-based growth in welfare and changes to
welfare rankings have occurred over time. Second, we consider the
ability of the FOD and AF methodologies to assess multidimen-
sional poverty from a rights-based perspective. As noted, satisfying
the tenets of the UDHR is an ongoing process and this is particu-
larly so in SSA, where access to minimal standards of living such
as basic sanitation, clean drinking water, adequate shelter, partic-
ipation via access to information, and primary education continues
to be out of reach for sizeable portions of the population. Being
able to assess multidimensional poverty while adhering to basic
rights principles (inalienability, indivisibility, interdependence,
and equality) is therefore particularly pertinent in the SSA context.
3.1. Data
The DHS provide relevant wellbeing data using a harmonized
survey structure across most of the 26 SSA countries examined in
this study (DHS, 2016). Although not all countries in SSA are
included, the investigated countries represent 84 per cent of the
population. Two DHS surveys were used for each country, repre-
senting a year close to 2002 (t = t1) and another year close to
2012 (t = t2), enabling us to monitor welfare changes over time
within a given country. The DHS were not available in both years
for South Africa and the DRC. As alternatives, the 2002 and 2012
national General Household Surveys (GHS) provide the data for
South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2003, 2013) and the 2001
MICS provides the first round of the DRC data (RDdC, 2002). The
MICS and DHS are highly compatible due to a close collaboration
to ensure that survey tools and methodologies are harmonized
and comparable.
Sample sizes for each country and year are displayed in Table 1.
The median first and last survey years are 2003 and 2012, respec-
tively. The sample size in the second round of surveys is typically
higher (median 13,300) than in the first round (median 8100),
but with major variations across countries (approximately
between 5000 and 38,000 observations in each round).
3.2. Indicator definitions
Multidimensional analysis in this study is based upon five bin-
ary welfare indicators. The choice of indicators draws upon the
widely-applied Bristol Indicators (Gordon, Nandy, Pantazis,
Pemberton, & Townsend, 2003) and aims to cover basic aspects
of wellbeing in a developing country setting—specifically: drinking
water, sanitation, shelter, communication, and education.
For each indicator, a household is either deemed to be deprived
and the indicator is assigned the value 0, or the household is not
deprived and the indicator takes the value 1. Indicator thresholds
are selected based on careful consideration of three factors. First,
following existing tradition in defining standards of wellbeing
brings relevance and context to threshold choices. Furthermore,
following tradition provides consistency across time, space, and
Table 1
Survey year, sample size, and population size.
Survey year Sample size Population (millions)d
t1 t2 Range (years) t1 t2 Total 2012
Benin (BEN) 2001 2011 10 5756 17,422 23,178 10.0
Burkina Faso (BFA) 2003 2010 7 9075 14,410 23,485 16.6
Cameroon (CMR) 2004 2011 7 10,435 14,177 24,612 21.7
Chad (TCD) 2004 2014 10 5358 17,108 22,466 12.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. (DRC)b 2001 2013 12 8622 18,144 26,766 70.3
Congo, Rep. (COG) 2005 2011 6 5870 11,610 17,480 4.3
Côte d’Ivoire (CIV)a 2005 2011 6 4348 9649 13,997 21.1
Ethiopia (ETH) 2000 2011 11 14,059 16,678 30,737 92.2
Gabon (GAB) 2000 2012 12 6171 9716 15,887 1.6
Ghana (GHA) 2003 2014 11 6233 11,834 18,067 25.5
Guinea (GIN) 2005 2012 7 6242 7103 13,345 11.6
Kenya (KEN) 2003 2014 11 8532 36,396 44,928 42.5
Lesotho (LSO) 2004 2014 10 8561 9402 17,963 2.1
Madagascar (MDG) 2004 2008 4 8412 17,832 26,244 22.3
Malawi (MWI) 2000 2010 10 13,648 24,789 38,437 15.7
Mali (MLI) 2001 2012 11 12,267 10,104 22,371 16.1
Mozambique (MOZ) 2003 2011 8 12,295 13,919 26,214 25.7
Namibia (NAM) 2000 2013 13 6342 9815 16,157 2.3
Nigeria (NGA) 2003 2013 10 7162 38,361 45,523 168.2
Rwanda (RWA) 2000 2014 14 9650 12,677 22,327 10.8
Senegal (SEN) 2005 2012 7 7359 8406 15,765 13.8
South Africa (ZAF)c 2002 2012 10 26,169 24,856 51,025 52.4
Tanzania (TZA)a 2003 2011 8 6484 10,019 16,503 48.6
Uganda (UGA) 2000 2011 11 7847 9028 16,875 35.4
Zambia (ZMB) 2001 2013 12 7110 15,868 22,978 14.8
Zimbabwe (ZWE) 2005 2010 5 9266 9756 19,022 14.6
Median 2003 2012 10 8130 13,298 22,419 16.4
Notes: Source: own calculations based on DHS standard surveys, except where noted.
a Côte d’Ivoire 2005, Tanzania 2003, Tanzania 2011 DHS AIS surveys.
b DRC 2001 MICS.
c South Africa 2002, 2012 GHS.
d World Bank (2016b).
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progress. Second, threshold choices must conform to the nature of
the available survey data. Even within surveys designed to be har-
monized across time and space, response categories may vary and
thus constrain the number of possible consistent thresholds. In
studies across nations and across time, such data restrictions can
be considerable. Finally, to provide informative comparisons,
thresholds are chosen such that they fall in the heart of the distri-
bution of outcomes. Welfare thresholds set such that the large
majority of the population is deprived or not deprived may con-
form to the first two criteria, but provide little information in wel-
fare comparisons. These three criteria are restrictive, and, as a
result, threshold choices are, in practice, relatively few.
Surveys such as the DHS, devoted to monitoring various aspects
of welfare, primarily provide categorical data. It is possible with
the FOD methodology to make use of the broader range of
information provided in these surveys by either using the full
range of outcomes or by defining categorical indicators with more
than two values. With five binary indicators, the combination of
possible welfare outcomes is 25 = 32. If instead we define three
categories per indicator, the number of possible combinations
increases to 35 = 243. Data requirements quickly become pro-
hibitive as the number of observations occupying combinations
of welfare outcomes may become quite small. This ‘curse of
dimensionality’ is even more pronounced when considering sub-
populations within a country such as regions or age groups. A
further consideration in deviating from binary indicators involves
the evolving nature of survey questionnaires. As noted above,
inconsistent survey response options make it challenging to
develop robust binary comparisons; this issue is even more restric-
tive when attempting to identify multiple categories through time
and across countries.3.2.1. Water
A household is not deprived in the water indicator when it
obtains drinking water from a safe source (tap, pipe, public stand-
pipe, tube-well, borehole, covered dug well, rainwater, or bottled/
sachet water). For monitoring progress in achieving the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), UNICEF and the World
Health Organization (WHO) developed a commonly adopted defi-
nition of improved water sources that also classifies covered
springs as safe (United Nations Children’s Fund & World Health
Organization, 2015). However, early rounds of the DHS do not dis-
tinguish between protected and unprotected springs. To maintain
consistency over time and to avoid confusing progress with house-
holds simply shifting between changing survey categories, our
definition classifies all springs as a deprivation.
3.2.2. Sanitation
A household is considered not deprived in sanitation when the
household has access to sanitation facilities and deprived when the
household relies upon buckets, hanging latrines, or open defeca-
tion. Our definition differs from that of UNICEF and WHO, which
specify deprivation in sanitation to include shared facilities, pit
latrines without a slab, and facilities that flush or pour to some-
where other than a sewer system, septic tank, or pit latrine. Four
issues in t1 surveys prevent us from adopting this widely-
accepted definition. First, in t1, improved pit latrines appear to
refer to ventilated improved pit latrines in some instances and to
any improved pit latrine in others. Second, there is no distinction
between traditional pit latrines with and without a slab. Third,
the surveys do not specify whether facilities flush to a sewer sys-
tem, septic tank, or pit latrine. Finally, the 2001 DRC MICS and
South African GHS surveys do not specify whether facilities are
shared. Consequently, we can only determine with consistency
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whether households use no facilities. As the latter deprivation
more closely corresponds to both policy goals and severe depriva-
tion indicators in other studies, this is the definition adopted here
(see Alkire & Housseini, 2014; Gordon et al., 2003).3.2.3. Shelter
Adequate flooring is often adopted as a proxy for housing qual-
ity (see for example the UNDP’s MPI (United Nations Development
Programme, 2016b)). In this study, we follow guidelines for
evaluating the SDG target 11.1 pertaining to adequate housing
and identify a household to be not deprived if the floor of its dwell-
ing is constructed from permanent material and deprived when
the floor is derived from non-permanent material (United
Nations Statistics Division, 2017). Solid floors primarily include
cement and brick, and to a lesser degree tile, carpet, vinyl, wood,
and parquet. Inadequate flooring mainly includes earth, sand,
dung, and palm/bamboo. The South Africa GHS does not report
flooring material and consequently we define shelter deprivation
in terms of wall quality instead.3.2.4. Communication
The inclusion of access to information and communication in
the SDGs highlights their critical role in ‘sustained, inclusive and
equitable economic growth and sustainable development, compet-
itiveness, access to information and knowledge, poverty eradica-
tion and social inclusion’ (United Nations General Assembly,
2015, p. 4). Our communication indicator measures radio, televi-
sion, and telephone (cellular or fixed) ownership.4 If the household
does not possess any of these communication methods, it is deemed
deprived.53.2.5. Education
As mentioned, the UDHR identifies education as a basic human
right. It is also an important indicator of the human capital level
within a household. The UNDP’s MPI and the MDG goal 2 both pri-
oritize completion of primary education (United Nations, 2015;
United Nations Development Programme, 2016b), while the SDG
target 4.1 strives for both primary and secondary completion
(United Nations Statistics Division, 2017). However, even primary
completion rates remain relatively low in many SSA countries. In
more than half of the countries considered in this study, less than
10 per cent of the adult sample completed secondary school. We
focus on primary education to achieve relevance while defining a
threshold that cuts through an informative range of the distribu-
tion across both countries and time. A household is not deprived
in education if one or more household members have completed
at least six years of schooling. Among the countries in this study,
six years of schooling is the median number of school years
required to complete primary school.4 While the SDGs emphasize the importance of internet access, information on
internet access is only collected in select country surveys in later years. However, a
sufficiently high correlation exists between mobile phone ownership and internet
access such that we do not feel this presents a deficiency in the communication
indicator. For instance, in countries for which the data are available, the share of
households with internet access that did not also have a mobile phone ranged from 0
per cent in Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso to 6 per cent in Benin, with most countries
at 1 per cent or less.
5 The 2000 Malawi DHS does not report phone possession. An examination of the
2004 Malawi DHS suggests that phone ownership is highly related to radio
ownership. In a sample of 13,664 households that do not own a radio, only 18
possess a phone. The 2001 DRC MICS does not report phone or television ownership
in rural areas. The 2007 DRC DHS, with a sample of 5189 households, indicates that
3482 rural households do not own a radio but only three of these households own a
television and only 27 own a mobile or fixed phone. Therefore, we do not consider
this lack of reporting to be a significant limitation.3.2.6. Indicator sensitivity
As noted above, it is not possible to define water and sanitation
thresholds in t1 according to commonly applied international stan-
dards. To evaluate the sensitivity of spatial outcomes to water and
sanitation thresholds, we specify alternative thresholds in t2 that
correspond to the UNICEF and WHO definitions of improved water
and sanitation described above. The improved sanitation indicator
is defined with and without considering whether the facility is
shared. Sensitivity to indicator thresholds in FOD analysis is also
explored by Ajakaiye, Jerome, Olaniyan, Mahrt, and Alaba (2016),
Arndt, Lerayo, Mahrt, and Tarp (2016), and Mahrt and Masumbu
(2016) in applications toNigeria, Tanzania, andZambia respectively.
The authors find that FOD temporal dynamics can be sensitive to
indicator thresholds, while spatial patterns are typically more
robust.
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Welfare indicator averages and the joint distribution of welfare
Overall, we see progress in most countries for most indicators,
but backsliding within welfare dimensions is also observed
(Table 2). Three countries experience welfare reductions in two
dimensions: Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria (sanitation and shelter) and
Rwanda (water and sanitation). Seven countries experience back-
sliding in one indicator: Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo,
Gabon, and Tanzania (sanitation); DRC and Madagascar (shelter);
and Burkina Faso (education). The remaining 16 countries see pro-
gress on average in all five dimensions. The degree of progress varies
substantially by dimension and area. For example, Ethiopia, which
starts from a very low base, achieves impressive progress in every
dimension, with the percentage of the population not deprived in
water, sanitation, and communication more than doubling. In con-
trast, South Africa, which starts from a high base, achieves relatively
modest gains in every indicator. Considering the 26 SSA countries in
aggregate, there is no backsliding (of weighted averages) in any
dimension. Population-weighted averages improve for the aggre-
gate in access to safe water (47–61 per cent), sanitation (68–75
per cent), shelter (43–45 per cent), communication access (62–79
per cent), and education (62–70 per cent).
We now focus on the joint welfare distribution at the household
level using two countries as examples. The complete joint distribu-
tion of welfare outcomes for Nigeria and Uganda are presented in
Table 3. Comparing the distributions for period t1, Nigeria has a
significantly higher rate of those not deprived in any of the five
indicators (24.7 versus 12.2 per cent), but only a slightly lower
share deprived in all indicators (3.0 versus 3.2 per cent). Most of
the distribution involves intermediate outcomes.
Without imposing weights, the relative importance of dimen-
sions cannot be ranked. Thus, the relative welfare of a household
deprived only in sanitation compared to a household deprived only
in water or even compared to a household deprived in all dimen-
sions except sanitation, is indeterminate. If we simply count the
number of indicators for which a household is not deprived, giving
each indicator equal weight, the average number of positivewelfare
outcomes in Nigeria is 3.3 and 3.6, compared to 2.8 and 3.4 in
Uganda, in t1 and t2 respectively. However, imposing alternative
weighting schemes may reverse estimated relative welfare. For
example, placing higher priority on water and sanitation outcomes
leads, in Nigeria, to attaining fewer positive outcomes (3.0 and 3.4)
than Uganda (3.2 and 3.8) in t1 and t2.While imposingweights facil-
itates comparability of outcomes, it violates the principle of indivis-
ibility. Furthermore, outcomes from weighted analysis have the
undesirable property of depending on the choice of weights. The
FOD approach applied in this study eliminates the need for weight-
ing schemes producing conclusions that are both robust to the
choice of weights and consistent with the rights-based approach.
Table 2
Individuals not deprived in welfare indicators, in t1 and t2 (per cent).
Water Sanitation Shelter Communication Education
t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2
Benin 66 75 32 41 59 61 77 86 39 56
Burkina Faso 58 76 30 36 40 44 68 82 34 32
Cameroon 59 63 93 92 49 54 68 81 70 74
Chad 36 56 28 30 5 9 41 71 28 42
Congo, D.R. 28 34 81 87 21 20 34 61 66 83
Congo, Rep. 58 73 90 90 58 67 64 90 90 90
Côte d’Ivoire 69 78 69 66 82 82 74 90 57 59
Ethiopia 19 42 18 62 7 11 22 49 23 44
Gabon 79 89 98 91 78 88 82 97 85 90
Ghana 66 88 74 79 86 93 75 93 74 83
Guinea 62 75 72 83 46 55 69 84 37 50
Kenya 42 57 81 87 34 45 76 91 84 90
Lesotho 73 77 56 71 59 65 58 91 85 90
Madagascar 32 37 54 56 40 37 61 65 39 41
Malawi 66 79 84 90 20 24 59 66 58 68
Mali 44 66 79 88 21 27 75 90 23 40
Mozambique 46 53 53 61 26 27 61 67 35 49
Namibia 77 84 41 49 42 56 76 95 86 91
Nigeria 40 63 75 70 65 61 76 89 72 73
Rwanda 42 40 97 97 15 25 40 77 50 63
Senegal 69 78 78 82 65 73 91 98 43 62
South Africa 86 93 86 95 81 89 88 99 96 97
Tanzania 51 54 89 86 27 32 61 80 85 88
Uganda 52 70 85 90 20 27 56 81 66 72
Zambia 53 63 73 84 39 44 50 81 81 86
Zimbabwe 75 76 68 71 66 69 53 73 94 96
Source: see Table 1.
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Temporal FOD analysis provides evidence of multidimensional
welfare performance over time. FOD tests lead to three possible
outcomes for each country: t2 dominates t1, t1 dominates t2, or
no dominance. Static outcomes derived from the actual survey data
provide little information in the case of indeterminacy and no
information on the extent of domination. Determining the fre-
quency of domination across 100 bootstrap samples partially fills
these gaps.6
Table 4 presents static and bootstrap FOD results. Sixteen coun-
tries experienced broad-based progress in welfare over time and
exhibited a high degree of correlation between static and bootstrap
outcomes. The average frequency (normalized to the interval [0,1]
henceforth) of domination in the bootstrap is 0.92 when static FOD
occurs. Eight countries achieved FOD in all 100 bootstraps (Ethio-
pia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda, and Zam-
bia) and six achieved FOD in more than 80 bootstraps (Ghana,
Malawi, Senegal, Benin, Lesotho, and Chad). Despite static FOD,
bootstrap sampling provides weaker likelihood of advancement
in Mozambique (0.57) and Zimbabwe (0.48), though both periods
of analysis cover a shorter time span of eight and five years,
respectively.
The average bootstrap frequency of domination for the 10
countries with indeterminate static FOD is only 0.08. Though a
few countries have weak evidence of advancement, Cameroon
(0.20), the DRC (0.17) and Burkina Faso (0.14), in most the fre-
quencies are very small (Madagascar, Tanzania, the Republic of
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Rwanda) or zero (Gabon and Nigeria).
Consistent with generally positive trends becoming more easily
identifiable over longer periods of time, the median timespan6 In practice, the number of bootstrap iterations can be chosen to be sufficiently
large to generate a complete ranking of the populations being compared. As will be
discussed, cases with slight differences in the frequency of domination provide a
weak basis for rankings. A greater number of bootstrap iterations does not improve
this basis as it reflects a paucity of differentiating information (using the FOD criteria)
in the underlying data.for countries with static FOD is 10 years compared to 7.5 for coun-
tries without static FOD. In no case (static or bootstrap) did the
first period dominate the second, indicating no broad-based
decline in welfare over time for any of the 26 analyzed SSA
nations.
In measuring broad-based progress, temporal FOD adheres to
basic rights principles in that if any segment of the population
(equality) is regressing in any dimension (inalienability), FOD will
not register advancement. All cases of temporal stagnation are
accompanied by backsliding in at least one welfare indicator (see
Table 2). Of note are Cameroon and Gabon, in which stagnation
was driven by diminished access to sanitation facilities. Despite
this reduction, both countries remain at the top in terms of
second-period sanitation welfare. Furthermore, both countries
achieved considerable progress in all other indicators. These
results draw attention to the need to interpret FOD outcomes
appropriately. FOD stagnation does not necessarily imply a lack
of any progress. Instead, it indicates that the progress was not
achieved throughout the distribution and among all indicators.
Overall, we find ample evidence of robust multidimensional pro-
gress in SSA and no evidence of multidimensional regress over
the period analyzed.
3.3.3. Spatial FOD
As with temporal comparisons, spatial FOD tests are conducted
using both the static and bootstrapping approaches. Spatial FOD
outcomes are the result of country-by-country comparisons,
whereby country A dominates country B, country B dominates
country A, or neither country dominates. Tables 5 and 6 present
bootstrap frequencies that a given row country first-order domi-
nates the corresponding column country. Static FOD exists except
when the bootstrap entry is underlined. Generally static FOD is
observed where there are higher probabilities of bootstrap FOD
(between 0.37 and 1) compared to no static FOD (between 0 and
0.45). Row averages represent the frequency that the row country
dominates all other countries while column averages indicate the
Table 3
Sample joint distribution of welfare indicators for Nigeria and Uganda, t1 and t2.
Outcome ranking Welfare indicator combinationsa Distribution (per cent)
1 2 3 4 5 Nigeria Uganda
t1 t2 Change t1 t2 Change
Worst outcome 0 0 0 0 0 3.0 2.2 0.7 3.2 1.1 2.1
Intermediate welfare combinations.
Combinations are not always rankable.
0 0 0 0 1 2.4 1.0 1.4 2.2 0.3 1.9
0 0 0 1 0 3.0 3.4 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.5
0 0 0 1 1 3.4 4.2 0.8 1.3 0.7 0.6
0 0 1 0 0 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1
0 0 1 0 1 1.4 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0 0 1 1 0 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
0 0 1 1 1 4.1 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
0 1 0 0 0 4.0 1.5 2.6 9.0 2.4 6.5
0 1 0 0 1 2.1 0.6 1.5 7.7 2.3 5.5
0 1 0 1 0 4.6 4.4 0.2 5.5 5.1 0.3
0 1 0 1 1 5.1 4.3 0.8 13.2 12.2 1.0
0 1 1 0 0 1.3 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0
0 1 1 0 1 2.5 0.2 2.2 0.7 0.2 0.5
0 1 1 1 0 3.9 2.4 1.5 0.3 0.5 0.2
0 1 1 1 1 17.7 6.4 11.2 3.7 4.4 0.7
1 0 0 0 0 0.9 1.0 0.2 3.4 2.7 0.7
1 0 0 0 1 0.6 0.5 0.2 2.2 1.2 1.0
1 0 0 1 0 0.5 1.7 1.2 0.6 1.2 0.5
1 0 0 1 1 1.0 2.6 1.6 1.1 1.8 0.6
1 0 1 0 0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 0 1 0 1 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1
1 0 1 1 0 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 0 1 1 1 2.0 6.7 4.7 0.1 0.2 0.1
1 1 0 0 0 1.4 1.2 0.2 5.6 4.0 1.6
1 1 0 0 1 0.5 0.6 0.1 7.4 4.2 3.2
1 1 0 1 0 1.1 3.4 2.3 4.2 8.2 4.0
1 1 0 1 1 1.8 6.3 4.5 12.5 25.1 12.6
1 1 1 0 0 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1
1 1 1 0 1 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.7 0.6 1.1
1 1 1 1 0 2.5 3.2 0.7 0.6 1.4 0.8
Best outcome 1 1 1 1 1 24.7 33.8 9.1 12.2 19.3 7.0
Sum 100 100 0 100 100 0
Avg. number of good outcomes Equal weights 3.3 3.6 0.3 2.8 3.4 0.6
Unequal weightsb 3.0 3.4 0.4 3.2 3.8 0.6
Source: see Table 1.
a Column headings 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, refer to water, sanitation, shelter, communication, and education, respectively.
b Weighting scheme of (2, 2, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
188 C. Arndt et al. /World Development 108 (2018) 181–196frequency that the column country is dominated by all other
countries.
Most domination in both periods occurs when Gabon or South
Africa dominate or when Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Madagascar,
or Mozambique are dominated. The remaining countries experi-
ence a greater occurrence of indeterminate outcomes. Indetermi-
nate outcomes occur when two countries are either very similar
or very different in the distribution of welfare in each indicator.
Consistent with the principle of indivisibility and as noted in the
discussion of Table 3, when welfare outcomes follow distinctly dif-
ferent patterns, FOD often cannot be determined. For example, in
the second period Rwanda exhibits a particularly high degree of
indeterminacy—it only dominates Ethiopia in bootstrap samples
and is never dominated. This outcome likely stems from a unique
pattern of relatively low water and shelter welfare coupled with
the highest welfare in sanitation.7 Shading draws attention to clusters in which sequential countries do not out-
perform one another by more than two FOD domination points. In these cases, it is
difficult to distinguish between differences in welfare and variability introduced
through bootstrapping.3.3.4. Country rankings
Table 7 presents country rankings in t1 and t2 based on the FOD
and AF methodologies. In the static case, spatial FOD tests allow
two countries to be ranked only when static results are determi-
nate; however, bootstrap frequencies of net-domination enable a
complete ranking of all countries (for a sufficient number of
bootstrap repetitions). FOD net-domination measures the averagefrequency across all bootstrap samples that a country dominates
all other countries minus the average frequency that it is domi-
nated by all other countries (Tables 5 and 6 average bootstrap
column values minus average bootstrap row values). To facilitate
comparisons with the AF adjusted headcount ratio, M0, we create
the FOD domination score by linearly transforming FOD net-
domination. Both the FOD domination score and M0 have a range
of [0,1], where better rankings of multidimensional welfare corre-
spond to lower values.7 As noted in Section 2.2, our AF poverty
threshold (k) identifies households with weighted deprivation shares
of at least one-third as multidimensionally poor. In this study, indi-
cators are assigned equal weight, and therefore, the poverty thresh-
old corresponds to two deprivations.
Both methods identify the same sets of countries with the high-
est (South Africa, Gabon, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, and Sene-
gal) and lowest (Mozambique, Madagascar, Chad, Ethiopia, Burkina
Faso, and the DRC) multidimensional welfare rankings. FOD and AF
also indicate large clusters of countries with similar outcomes. In
t2, half of all countries fall within a 10-point FOD domination score
Table 4
Temporal static FOD and normalized frequency of temporal bootstrap FOD.
Source: see Table 1.
C. Arndt et al. /World Development 108 (2018) 181–196 189range [0.44 and 0.54] and a 14-pointM0 range [0.19, 0.33]. Despite
the very different methodologies, the FOD domination score and
M0 have a correlation coefficient of 0.95 in both periods, and a
Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 0.95 and 0.97 in t1 and
t2, respectively. This high degree of correlation is consistent with
applications by Arndt, Hussain, Salvucci, Tarp, and Østerdal
(2016) to Mozambican census data, Arndt, Lerayo, Mahrt, and
Tarp (2016) to Tanzanian DHS data, and Permanyer and Hussain
(2017) to DHS data in 38 countries.Changes in rankings over time must be interpreted carefully
due to the large clusters of countries with very similar FOD domi-
nation scores and M0. Nevertheless, a notable degree of rank per-
sistence occurs, particularly with the AF methodology. Rankings
change substantially between t1 and t2 in only a few countries.
With the AF approach, only Lesotho moves more than a few ranks.
Consistent with robust evidence of FOD temporal advancement,
FOD domination scores indicate Lesotho, Guinea, and Zambia
improve six, six, and five places, respectively. Tanzania, which
Table 5
Normalized frequency of bootstrap spatial FOD, t = t1.
ETH TCD MDG MOZ BFA DRC UGA GIN ZMB BEN MLI NGA MWI KEN LSO TZA NAM ZWE CMR RWA CIV GHA SEN COG GAB ZAF Avg
ETH 0
TCD 0
MLI 0.39 0.02
DRC 1 0.04
MDG 1 0.12 0.04
RWA 1 0.35 0.05
BFA 1 0.90 0.08
MOZ 1 0.93 0.08
ZMB 1 1 0.08
MWI 1 1 0.08
ZWE 1 1 0.08
LSO 1 1 0.05 0.08
UGA 1 1 0.10 0.08
KEN 1 0.96 0.02 0.35 0.09
BEN 1 0.97 0.71 0.11
NAM 1 1 0.79 0.11
NGA 1 0.93 0.99 0.01 0.12
GIN 1 1 0.06 0.75 0.37 0.13
TZA 1 1 0.04 0.98 0.21 0.13
CIV 1 1 1 1 0.95 0.09 0.01 0.20
GHA 1 1 1 1 1 0.27 0.01 0.21
CMR 1 1 0.99 1 0.11 0.99 0.94 0.24
SEN 1 1 0.99 1 1 0.98 0.61 0.28 0.27
COG 1 1 0.91 0.98 1 0.48 0.97 0.66 0.28
GAB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.77 1 1 1 0.67 0.24 0.51 0.01 1 0.85 0.01 0.64
ZAF 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.79 1 1 1 1 1 0.99 1 1 0.04 1 1 0.21 0.68
Avg. 0.94 0.81 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.15
Notes: Row country dominates column country. Static FOD static domination occurs with bootstrap domination except when underlined. Countries are sorted by the AVG
column (ascending) and row (descending). Country abbreviations are listed in Table 1.
Source: see Table 1.
Table 6
Normalized frequency of bootstrap spatial FOD, t = t2.
ETH TCDD MOZ MDG BFA BEN DRC NGA ZMB CIV TZA GIN MLI MWI UGA KEN LSO COG CMR SEN NAM ZWE GAB RWA GHA ZAF Avg.
ETH 0
TCD 0
MDG 0
BFA 0
DRC 0.01 0
MWI 0.04 0.04 0
MOZ 0.14 0.01
RWA 0.38 0.02
MWI 1 0.04
BEN 1 0.24 0.05
TZA 1 0.12 0.59 0.01 0.21 0.08
NAM 1 1 0.08
UGA 1 1 0.16 0.09
GIN 1 1 0.58 1 0.08 0.15
KEN 1 0.83 0.97 1 0.06 0.15
ZWE 1 0.96 1 1 0.16
NGA 1 1 1 1 0.16
ZMB 1 1 1 1 0.16
CMR 1 1 1 1 0.16
LSO 1 1 1 1 0.64 0.74 0.06 0.22
CIV 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.77 0.91 0.23
SEN 1 1 1 1 0.71 0.94 0.33 0.24
COG 1 1 1 1 0.01 0.99 0.04 1 0.81 0.05 0.01 0.28
GHA 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.97 1 0.32
GAB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.91 0.97 1 0.99 0.96 0.81 0.45 0.36 0.26 0.11 0.01 0.63
ZAF 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.99 1 1 1 0.67 0.91
Avg. 0.66 0.64 0.53 0.52 0.26 0.22 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0 0 0 0.16
Notes: see Table 5. Source: see Table 1.
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Table 7
Country ranks by FOD domination scores and M0.
Notes: Sorted by t2 FOD domination scores. Shaded areas highlight t2 consecutive rankings based on very small differences in FOD domination scores. Care
must be taken in interpretation due to variability introduced through bootstrapping.
Countries are low-income except: * lower middle-income country; ** upper middle-income country.
Source: see Table 1.
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places. Despite a high likelihood of FOD temporal advancement,
Benin falls from a rank of 15 to 21. Though Benin advances in every
indicator, its relative welfare, particularly in communication,
advances more slowly than in Lesotho, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana,
which results in more cases of Benin being dominated. This exam-
ple and the somewhat greater degree of rank fluctuation with the
FOD methodology in general likely stems from FOD’s strict consid-
eration of the full welfare distribution. Comparisons of FOD and AF
outcomes are discussed in more detail in the next section.3.3.5. FOD versus AF
This section highlights how FOD’s strict adherence to the prin-
ciples of inalienability and equality results in divergent FOD and AF
rankings. South Africa ranks highest in both time periods using
both methodologies. However, FOD indicates that South Africa
dominates other countries with greater frequency in t2 compared
to t1. This more frequent dominance by South Africa compares to
a convergence (catch-up by other countries) that occurs in AF. This
difference highlights a fundamental distinction between the AF
and FOD approaches, which is that FOD requires domination in
192 C. Arndt et al. /World Development 108 (2018) 181–196all dimensions. It also recalls the discussion at the end of
Section 2.4, which emphasizes the ordinal nature of FOD and the
property of the net-domination measure as a frequency count.
South Africa dominated other nations less frequently in t1. For
example, in t1, all bootstrap comparisons between South Africa
and Gabon are indeterminate even though South Africa outper-
formed Gabon in terms of the share of the population not deprived
in all dimensions except sanitation (Table 5). Relative welfare gains
in South African sanitation result in South Africa dominating
Gabon in 67 bootstrap comparisons in t2 (Table 6). Similar scenar-
ios occur between South Africa and other top-performing coun-
tries, including the Republic of Congo, Senegal, and Cameroon.
Consequently, the FOD domination score captures more frequent
domination of other countries by South Africa in t2. In contrast,
AF indicates an overall catching up by other countries in terms of
average incidence and intensity of deprivations as captured by
the MPI.
A similar difference between FOD and AF exists when compar-
ing temporal outcomes. In contrast to temporal FOD (Table 4), the
AF method indicates progress in every country in terms of reduced
M0. Greater reductions in M0 generally correspond to higher fre-
quencies of FOD improvement. Notable differences include
Rwanda and the DRC, which reduce M0 by 0.13 and 0.14 without
FOD advancement, while South Africa improves M0 by only 0.05
but achieves FOD advancement in every bootstrap iteration. The
finding of stagnation in 10 countries using FOD and progress in
all countries using AF stems from M0’s derivation from average
poverty incidence and intensity levels compared to FOD’s strict cri-
teria that advancement must occur in all indicators and throughout
the distribution. The methods are complementary in that M0 pro-
vides a sense of overall trends while FOD, in a sense, establishes
a lower bound consistent with the basic human rights framework.
Temporal FOD is difficult to achieve, but when it occurs it robustly
indicates progress without neglecting any welfare dimensions or
any segment of the population. While FOD is more consistent with
the principles of basic human rights, both measures provide useful
information regarding relative welfare and welfare advancement.
3.3.6. Middle-income countries
The asterisks in Table 7 indicate upper (double asterisk) and
lower middle-income (single asterisk) country status.8 A strong
correspondence exists between middle-income status and FOD and
M0 rankings in both time periods. Senegal and Zimbabwe are excep-
tions; they are not middle-income countries but outperform some
middle-income countries in both time periods. In t1, Zambia had
not yet achieved middle-income status and had a relatively poor
FOD rank of 18 among the 26 countries studied here. Though it exhi-
bits a strong likelihood of rank advancement between periods, Zam-
bia remained at the bottom of the middle-income countries in t2.
Nigeria (Africa’s most populous nation) does not exhibit progress
in the temporal analysis. Moreover, it ranks poorly among middle-
income countries in t2. This weak performance can be attributed to
relatively low welfare in water and sanitation, backsliding in
sanitation and flooring, and stagnation in education. Nigeria has
not been able to approach the other major oil exporters, Cameroon
and Gabon (see also Collier, Soludo, and Pattillo (2008) on Nigeria’s
performance and challenges).
3.3.7. Correlations with other welfare measures
Table 8 presents several common measures of wellbeing and
their associated rankings for the 26 study countries. These8 Lower middle-income economies are those with a per capita PPP adjusted gross
national income (GNI) between US$1026 and US$4035, and upper middle-income
economies are those with a per capita PPP adjusted GNI between US$4036 and US
$12,475 (World Bank, 2016a).measures include the World Bank’s US$1.90 and US$3 per day pov-
erty headcount ratios, gross domestic product (GDP), average
annual GDP per capita growth, UNDP’s Human Development Index
(HDI), and UNDP’s MPI, which measures M0 for an internationally
standardized set of indicators. Excluding GDP growth, the rankings
suggest that for a given country this collection of indicators might
tell very similar (Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique, and South Africa) or
very different stories (Chad, Ethiopia, and Madagascar).
Table 9 presents correlation and Spearman rank correlation
coefficients between the FOD domination score and each welfare
measure. The FOD domination score is most highly correlated with
the other measure of multidimensional welfare, the MPI (0.82), and
the HDI (0.72), and to a lesser degree with GDP per capita (0.67)
and the US$3.20 per day poverty headcount ratio (0.66). FOD is
only moderately correlated with the often-cited US$1.90 poverty
headcount ratio (0.53), which reiterates the need for triangulation
in poverty analysis.
These results are consistent with findings of two recent cross-
country studies of multidimensional poverty in SSA. Batana
(2013) finds low and positive Spearman rank correlations between
M0 and both monetary and asset poverty headcounts, and negative
and moderate to high correlations betweenM0 and HDI. Alkire and
Housseini (2014) consider the relationship between multidimen-
sional poverty and monetary poverty dynamics. Their analysis
finds that, among the countries with two periods of consistent
MPI ratios and US$1.25 per day poverty ratios, half the countries
reduced multidimensional poverty faster than income poverty.
They also found a low correlation between annualized reductions
in M0 and annualized growth in GNI.3.3.8. Indicator sensitivity analysis
Greater detail in recent DHS questionnaires allows us to specify
improved water and sanitation indicators in t2 following United
Nations Children’s Fund and World Health Organization (2015)
thresholds and to evaluate sensitivity to indicator thresholds.9
The default water indicator classifies tap, pipe, public standpipe,
tube-well, borehole, covered dug well, rainwater, or bottled/sachet
water as non-deprived sources. The improved water indicator also
includes protected springs as non-deprived. The default sanitation
indicator classifies households using any sanitation facility as non-
deprived. The improved sanitation facilities indicator excludes pit
latrines without a slab and facilities that flush or pour to somewhere
other than a sewer system, septic tank, or pit latrine. We define
improved sanitation with and without the criterion that improved
sanitation is not shared.
Table 10 presents average welfare levels based on original
water and sanitation indicators and improved water and sanita-
tion indicators (with and without the shared sanitation criterion).
In most of the countries, using the improved water indicator
results in virtually no change in terms of the share of population
classified as not deprived in this indicator. However, in Camer-
oon, the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda, increased welfare is
significant at 6, 17, 9, 10, and 32 percentage points, respectively.
Thus, the population-weighted aggregate welfare increases from
58.4 per cent using the original water indicator to 62.9 per cent
with the improved water indicator. In contrast, welfare in
sanitation is profoundly different both in terms of levels and
relative welfare between the countries. Modifications to the
sanitation indicator significantly decrease aggregate sanitation
welfare from 73.9 per cent to 40.7 per cent and 23.9 per cent
using the improved and unshared improved sanitation indicators,
respectively.9 The 2012 South Africa GHS does not distinguish between covered and uncovered
pit latrines and therefore South Africa was excluded from the sensitivity analysis.
Table 8
Common welfare measures (2012 except where noted).
US$1.90
poverty ratea
US$3.20
poverty ratea
GDP per capita GDP per
capita
growthb
HDI MPIa
(%) Rank (%) Rank Constant 2010 US$ Rank (%) (%) Index Rank Index Rank
Benin 53.1 18 75.6 16 747 17 0.6 21 0.48 16 0.31 14
Burkina Faso 43.7 15 74.7 15 614 20 3.1 13 0.39 25 0.54 24
Cameroon 24.0 5 43.5 3 1188 9 0.8 20 0.50 11 0.25 9
Chad 38.4 14 64.8 10 913 13 6.0 2 0.39 26 0.55 25
Congo, D.R. 77.1 25 90.7 26 334 26 2.4 15 0.42 21 0.40 21
Congo, Rep. 37.0 12 59.6 9 3007 4 1.8 18 0.58 5 0.18 6
Côte d’Ivoire 29.0 7 55.1 7 1248 8 0.5 24 0.45 18 0.31 16
Ethiopia 33.5 8 71.3 14 392 25 6.1 1 0.43 20 0.56 26
Gabon 8.0 1 24.4 1 10,031 1 0.0 23 0.67 1 0.07 2
Ghana 25.2 6 49.0 6 1570 6 4.3 8 0.57 6 0.16 5
Guinea 35.3 11 68.7 13 440 23 0.4 22 0.41 23 0.46 23
Kenya 33.6 9 58.9 8 1043 11 1.9 17 0.54 7 0.19 7
Lesotho 59.7 20 77.3 19 1162 10 3.2 12 0.48 13 0.16 4
Madagascar 77.8 26 90.5 25 409 24 0.5 25 0.51 9 0.36 18
Malawi 70.9 24 87.6 24 474 21 2.5 14 0.43 19 0.27 11
Mali 49.3 17 77.7 20 794 15 5.4 4 0.41 22 0.46 22
Mozambique 68.7 23 87.5 23 453 22 4.5 6 0.41 24 0.39 20
Namibia 22.6 4 45.7 5 5436 3 3.5 10 0.62 3 0.19 8
Nigeria 53.5 19 76.5 18 2399 5 6.0 3 0.51 10 0.30 13
Rwanda 60.4 21 80.7 22 618 19 5.4 5 0.48 14 0.26 10
Senegal 38.0 13 66.3 12 997 12 1.0 19 0.46 17 0.31 15
South Africa 16.6 2 34.7 2 7564 2 2.0 16 0.66 2 0.04 1
Tanzania 46.6 16 76.1 17 754 16 3.5 11 0.51 8 0.33 17
Uganda 34.6 10 65.0 11 653 18 4.0 9 0.48 15 0.37 19
Zambia 64.4 22 78.9 21 1557 7 4.5 7 0.58 4 0.28 12
Zimbabwe 21.4 3 45.5 4 800 14 3.4 26 0.49 12 0.13 3
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2016a), World Bank (2016b), and own calculations.
a Most recent survey.
b Average annual growth over the period 2002–12.
Table 9
Correlations between FOD and common welfare measures in survey closest to 2012 (Spearman rank correlations in parentheses).
FOD US$1.90 US$3.20 GDP per capita HDI MPI
FOD 1
US$1.90 0.53 (0.59) 1
US$3.20 0.66 (0.65) 0.94 (0.97) 1
GDP per capita 0.67 (0.75) 0.58 (0.56) 0.73 (0.67) 1
HDI 0.72 (0.65) 0.48 (0.39) 0.66 (0.44) 0.81 (0.72) 1
MPI 0.82 (0.82) 0.37 (0 .41) 0.59 (0.49) 0.61 (0.71) 0.82 (0.80) 1
Source: see Tables 1 and 7.
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tors. Despite differences in welfare levels, spatial comparisons are
not vastly different and result in no major changes in the top or
bottom tiers. Most countries falling in the middle move no more
than a few ranks, which is not a robust result given the tight clus-
ters of domination scores and variability introduced with boot-
strapping. There are a few exceptions. Most notably, with both
sets of improved indicators, Benin and Namibia perform signifi-
cantly better using the FOD and AF methodologies and Rwanda
performs better using the AF methodology, bringing it closer in line
with spatial FOD rankings for t2. Accounting for sensitivity to
methodology and indicator choice, it would be reasonable to draw
general conclusions regarding the relative welfare of countries,
such as: ‘Senegal falls in the upper quarter’; ‘Malawi falls in the
lower middle’; and ‘Gabon dominates most countries’. However,
caution is pertinent in comparisons among tightly clustered coun-
tries. For example, ‘Nigeria outperforms Rwanda’ is a claim that
does not hold across indicator choice and which is not robust to
differences in FOD dominance scores.4. Conclusion
In this study, the FOD and AF approaches to evaluating multidi-
mensional welfare were presented and applied to 26 SSA countries
in two-time periods. Primary data came from the DHS, except for
the South African national household surveys and the 2001 DRC
MICS. Surveys from years as close to 2002 and 2012 as possible
were applied for each of the 26 included countries. Using both
methodologies, we evaluated whether a country has achieved wel-
fare gains between two-time periods and whether one country
dominates another.
While FOD conforms well to three fundamental principles of
human rights, AF does not. First, FOD comparisons are independent
of any applied weighting schemes (indivisibility). Second, FOD can-
not be established when welfare in any indicator is deteriorating,
no matter how great the advancement is in other indicators
(inalienability). Finally, FOD requires that domination occurs
throughout the population (equality). Welfare gains among
better-off groups never offset welfare losses among worse-off
Table 10
Individuals not deprived in default and improved water and sanitation indicators, t = t2 (per cent).
Default water Improved water Default sanitation Improved sanitation Improved sanitation (not shared)
Benin 75 77 41 31 15
Burkina Faso 76 77 36 30 16
Cameroon 63 69 92 57 40
Chad 56 56 30 15 8
Congo, D.R. 34 51 87 41 21
Congo, Rep. 73 77 90 43 14
Côte d’Ivoire 78 78 66 47 22
Ethiopia 42 51 62 16 9
Gabon 89 93 91 63 38
Ghana 88 88 79 70 15
Guinea 75 76 83 45 21
Kenya 57 67 87 48 25
Lesotho 77 82 71 70 51
Madagascar 37 40 56 6 3
Malawi 79 79 90 14 9
Mali 66 66 88 42 24
Mozambique 53 53 61 28 24
Namibia 84 84 49 45 34
Nigeria 63 64 70 54 34
Rwanda 40 72 97 72 58
Senegal 78 78 82 63 49
Tanzania 54 56 86 34 24
Uganda 70 70 90 32 19
Zambia 63 64 84 45 28
Zimbabwe 76 77 71 62 38
Source: see Table 1.
Table 11
Country ranks by FOD domination scores and M0 using the improved water and sanitation indicators (t = t2).
No distinction between shared and unshared sanitation
facilities
Shared sanitation facilities are a deprivation
FOD dom. score Rank M0 Rank FOD dom. score Rank M0 Rank
Gabon 0.16 1 0.09 1 0.17 1 0.10 1
Ghana 0.21 3 0.10 2 0.41 6 0.14 2
Congo, Rep. 0.38 7 0.21 6 0.44 9 0.23 4
Senegal 0.35 5 0.21 4 0.35 4 0.23 6
Lesotho 0.20 2 0.16 3 0.20 2 0.17 3
Zimbabwe 0.40 8 0.21 5 0.40 5 0.23 7
Cameroon 0.48 13 0.30 11 0.44 9 0.32 11
Côte d’Ivoire 0.41 9 0.24 8 0.41 7 0.28 8
Kenya 0.37 6 0.28 10 0.43 8 0.31 10
Guinea 0.53 15 0.35 15 0.52 15 0.38 15
Namibia 0.27 4 0.21 7 0.24 3 0.23 5
Zambia 0.46 10 0.33 12 0.46 13 0.35 12
Nigeria 0.48 12 0.28 9 0.46 11 0.30 9
Rwanda 0.46 11 0.34 13 0.46 11 0.36 14
Uganda 0.54 16 0.40 17 0.52 16 0.42 17
Tanzania 0.55 17 0.39 16 0.53 17 0.40 16
Malawi 0.58 18 0.47 21 0.57 18 0.48 20
Mali 0.61 19 0.44 18 0.58 19 0.47 19
Congo, D.R. 0.65 21 0.46 20 0.64 21 0.49 21
Benin 0.50 14 0.34 14 0.51 14 0.36 13
Burkina Faso 0.63 20 0.44 19 0.60 20 0.47 18
Madagascar 0.79 23 0.59 23 0.79 23 0.60 23
Mozambique 0.79 22 0.53 22 0.66 22 0.54 22
Chad 0.84 24 0.60 24 0.84 24 0.61 24
Ethiopia 0.88 25 0.65 25 0.89 25 0.66 25
Average 0.50 13 0.34 13 0.50 13 0.36 13
FOD–M0 correlation 0.98 0.95
Spearman rank correlation 0.97 0.97
Source: see Table 1.
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and makes use of average outcomes to compile a welfare index,
and therefore goes against the principles of indivisibility, inalien-
ability, and equality. The strength of the AF approach is that it is
useful in summarizing welfare trends and provides an indication
of multidimensional welfare when FOD results are indeterminate.In all analyses, we find that South Africa and/or Gabon top the
country rankings. Other top performers include Ghana, the
Republic of Congo, Senegal, and in some cases Zimbabwe and
Lesotho. Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique, Madagascar, Burkina Faso,
and the DRC are consistently in the bottom tier. Great strides in
access to basic amenities in Ethiopia and Chad have led to less
C. Arndt et al. /World Development 108 (2018) 181–196 195differentiation among the bottom ranks. The remaining countries
are tightly clustered in the middle and often difficult to rank with
confidence. Middle-income countries outperform lower-income
countries in most cases.
For the 26 SSA nations, neither AF nor FOD indicate regress, but
the methodologies diverge on their assessment of progress over
the study period. While the AF methodology suggests that all coun-
tries are advancing on average, the FOD, with its strict adherence to
criteria that are consistent with human rights, is less categorical.
FOD indicates that 14 countries experienced broad-based increases
in welfare, while two countries showmore moderate likelihoods of
progress, and the remaining 10 countries neither improve nor
deteriorate in terms of multidimensional welfare. In sum, for SSA
as a region, we can safely conclude that welfare is improving. At
the same time, challenges remain in assuring that benefits of
well-documented growth are widely distributed.
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